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 Criminal Justice Decision Making as a Stratification
 Process: The Role of Race and Stratification Resources
 in Pretrial Release
 Celesta A. Albonetti,1 Robert M. Ha user,2 John Hagan,3 and
 llene H. Nagel4
 Our purpose is to bridge the criminal justice and stratification research literatures
 and to pursue the argument that homologous structural principles stratify alloca
 tion processes across central institutions of American society. The principle
 observed here in the making of bail decisions, as in earlier studies of the allocation
 of earnings, is that stratification resources operate to the greater advantage of
 whites than blacks. The operation of this principle is established through the
 estimation of covariance structure models of pretrial release decisions affecting
 5660 defendants in 10 federal courts. Education and income are treated in this
 study as observed components of a composite construct, stratification resources,
 which works to the greater advantage of whites. Prior record is also found to
 operate to the greater advantage of whites. Two further variables, dangerousness
 and community ties, increase bail severity among blacks and whites. While the
 effect of community ties has been legally legitimized since the Bail Reform Act
 of 1966, the effect of dangerousness was not so legitimized until the Bail Reform
 Act of 1984. However, because our data precede the latter act, they confirm that
 this act simply reinstitutionalized earlier practice. Meanwhile, our race-specific
 findings may explain why although this and earlier studies find negligible main
 effects of race on criminal justice outcomes, black Americans nonetheless per
 ceive more criminal injustice than do whites. In the criminal justice system, as
 in other spheres of American society, whites receive a better return on their
 resources, but our findings that the statutory severity of the offense and
 dangerousness work to the relative disadvantage of white defendants challenges
 conflict and labeling theory's one-dimensional characterization of black defen
 dant disadvantage.
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 1. INTRODUCTION
 Are there structural principles that stratify allocation processes across
 the central institutions of American society? Status attainment and class
 analysis traditions of sociological research both suggest affirmative answers
 to this question. With regard to the criminal justice system, both traditions
 make their cases for such an assumption in intriguing ways. The status
 attainment tradition notes a remarkable regularity in the way respondents
 rank the seriousness of crimes and punishments, a regularity that parallels
 rankings of occupational prestige (Rossi et al, 1974; Blumstein et al., 1983).
 The class analysis tradition notes that it was not until the nineteenth century
 and the successful establishment of capitalist modes of production that
 fixed periods of imprisonment proportional to the ranked seriousness of
 crimes became a guiding principle of criminal punishment (Humphries and
 Greenberg, 1984). Of course, both traditions can also note the parallel
 emphasis placed on equality of treatment in the criminal justice system
 (e.g., Balbus, 1977) and on equality of opportunity in the wider economy
 (e.g., Featherman and Hauser, 1978). But it is the attention given to the
 patterning of inequalities relative to such expectations that makes both
 these traditions of sociological research of particular interest in the study
 of criminal justice decision making, as a stratification system guided by
 structural principles like those of other institutions of allocation.5
 The logic of the above arguments is not in question, nor is the import
 ance of establishing a correspondence between criminal justice decision
 making and other stratification systems. However, doing so requires greater
 evidence of similar structuring principles, particularly with regard to pat
 terned inequalities, than currently exists in the criminal justice research
 literature. The problem may be that studies of criminal justice decision
 making have focused with rather inconsistent results, for example, on issues
 of racial inequality, while they have neglected the connection of race to
 other aspects of the stratification process (but see Lizotte, 1978; Hagan and
 Bumiller, 1983).
 A convincing demonstration that homologous structural principles
 underlie criminal justice decision making and other allocation processes
 requires a combined consideration of race and other stratification resources
 (Farnworth and Horan, 1980). One of the most intriguing findings in the
 5 For purposes of illustration, the education system is seen as an institution allocating credentials
 that serve to legitimate practice within fields of expertise. Similarly, the criminal justice system
 can be seen as an institution allocating justice as prescribed by substantive and procedural
 law within broad discretionary limits. At the pretrial release decision, magistrates dispense
 levels of liberty with the most severe measure of punitiveness, that of the denial of liberty
 during pretrial processing.
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 stratification literature is that black males receive lower returns in income
 for their educational achievements than do whites (Weiss, 1970; Siegel,
 1965; Duncan, 1969; Wright, 1978). Although there is some evidence of
 change in these patterns over time (Hout, 1984; Featherman and Hauser,
 1978; Wilson, 1978), the unequal returns that blacks and whites historically
 have received on their resources remains as evidence of an important
 structural principle at work in the stratification of American society. Below
 we look for evidence of the operation of such a principle at an early stage
 of the criminal justice process, the making of pretrial release decisions.
 First, however, we must explore the nature of these decisions and our
 approach to the analysis of this stratification process.
 2. PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS
 Pretrial release decisions are the culmination of a low-visibility alloca
 tion process. Although these decisions receive little public attention,
 especially at the federal level, it is increasingly apparent that these early
 determinations exert a substantial effect on subsequent decisions of greater
 visibility. For example, Goldkamp (1979; see also Hagan et al., 1980; Lizotte,
 1978) found that defendants detained in jail during pretrial stages of felony
 prosecution received more severe sentences. It is argued that being detained
 in jail decreases a defendant's ability to build a defense and that the stigma
 of detainment itself further disdvantages defendants, especially injury trials.
 Research has sought, therefore, to determine what types of defendants are
 most likely to be detained prior to trial, focusing particularly on the role
 of legal and extralegal attributes in the making of these decisions. Below
 we operationalize two extralegal attributes, education and income, as
 indicators of a construct we will call stratification resources.6 Following the
 lead of earlier stratification research, our interest is in examining the possible
 interaction of race with these stratification resources and other legal and
 extralegal variables in structuring the allocation of pretrial release. Our
 guiding hypothesis reflects the broader structural principle noted above:
 that stratification resources operate to the greater advantage of whites than
 blacks. Before we explore this hypothesis further, however, we must intro
 duce a debate about bail that underwrites the current legislative definition
 of criteria that are legally relevant to pretrial release decisions.
 Critics of America's early and largely cash bail system have argued
 that the only legal function of bail was to assure the return of the accused
 6We call this construct variable stratification resources in a conscious effort to bridge the status
 attainment and class analysis traditions. We could have called this variable status or class
 resources. The point is that stratification resources can be regarded as either status or class
 resources or both.
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 for subsequent hearings (Beeley, 1927; Morse and Beattie, 1932; Foote,
 1954,1959). Proponents of this position, then and now, insist that preventive
 detention prior to trial violates the constitutional rights of the accused and
 is contrary to the principles of the presumption of innocence. Opponents
 of this position (Mitchell, 1969; Hess, 1971) maintain that the legitimate
 function of bail is twofold: to assure the appearance of the accused and to
 protect the community from dangerous defendants.
 An analysis of Supreme Court decisions of the 1950s and early 1960s
 reveals that other than a broadly conceived "right to bail" in noncapital
 cases prior to trial, no real judicial consensus on pretrial release was
 established.7 The form of bail and the criteria to be considered in its
 determination remained uncertain. Congress entered the debate with the
 passage of the Bail Reform Act of 1966.8 This act attempted to reform the
 excessive use of cash bail in the federal courts by making the defendant's
 appearance at trial, rather than his or her possible "danger to the com
 munity" during the pretrial period, the only factor to be considered in
 setting bail. Defendant's dangerousness could be used as a criterion in
 deciding bail in the special case of a capital offense charge.
 The Bail Reform Act of 19849 reversed much of this thinking by
 providing for the inclusion of information on the defendant's potential
 dangerousness to the community in deciding the severity of bail decisions.
 The effect of this legislation was explicitly to give bail decision making the
 dual function described above, encompassing both a concern for flight risk
 and protection of the community from the potential dangerousness of the
 7This debate over the legitimate function of bail is reflected in two landmark cases heard by
 the Supreme Court in 1951. In Stack v. Boyle (72 S. Ct. 1) and Carlson v. London (72 S. Ct.
 525) the majority opinions laid out contradictory criteria for deciding bail and have sub
 sequently been the source of support for the two opposing views identified. To support the
 dual assertion that the defendant does not have a constitutional right to bail and that the use
 of bail for preventive detention is legitimate, Mitchell (1969) and Hess (1971) cite the opinion
 delivered in Carlson v. London. On the other hand, Foote (1954), Harvard Law Review (1966),
 Fabricant (1969), Tribe (1970), and Borman (1971) rely on the decision in Stack v. Boyle to
 argue for a right to bail while also insisting that preventive detention is unconstitutional. The
 cases decided by the Supreme Court since 1951 are extensions of these two views. In Herzog
 v. U.S. (1955), Reynolds v. U.S. (1959), Brady v. U.S. (1961), Brady v. U.S. (1962), and
 Fernandez v. U.S. (1961) the Supreme Court argued the role of bail is that of assuring
 appearance. On the other hand, decisions in Carbo v. U.S. (1962), Sellars v. U.S. (1968), and
 Russell v. U.S. (1968) maintained that threat to the community is a legitimate criterion in the
 determination of pretrial release decisions. The court relied on the defendant's prior record
 and use of a weapon as indicators of dangerousness. We have relied on Goldkamp's (1979)
 earlier research in presenting the history of the debate as it has been expressed in court
 decisions relevant for this research. See footnote 12 for most recent decisions.
 sThe Bail Reform Act of 1966 Pub. L. No. 89-465, 80 Stat. 214
 'The Bail Reform Act of 1984 Pub. L. No. 94-473, 98 Stat, 1976.
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 released defendant. This dual function is reinforced by the recent Supreme
 Court decision in U.S. v. Salerno.10 The majority opinion in this case held
 that preventive detention prior to trial is not unconstitutional, because
 "Congress formulated the detention provisions not as punishment for
 dangerous individuals, but as a potential solution to the pressing societal
 problem of crime committed by persons on release." By this decision the
 Supreme Court reversed the lower Court of Appeal's decision (3142) that
 "authorization of pretrial detention on the ground of future dangerousness
 is facially unconstitutional as a violation of the Fifth Amendment's substan
 tive due process guarantee."
 While it is clear that the 1984 act and the recent Supreme Court decision
 in Salerno mark a shift in the formal legal functions of bail, it is not so
 clear that lower-court practices were free of this dual function prior to these
 higher-court and legislative developments. Indeed, it may well be as
 anthropologist Paul Bohannon (1965) suggested some time ago, that such
 changes only reinstitutionalize existing practices. That is, law may move
 from the bottom up, as well as from the top down. As we note further
 below, examination of court practices after the 1966 act, but before the
 1984 act, can provide a test of this possibility. First, however, we review
 prior research on bail decision making.
 3. PRIOR RESEARCH
 Early studies of pretrial release sought to document a widespread and
 ill-founded reliance on cash bail and its differential impact on the poor.
 An apparently discriminatory impact of cash bail on the poor was often
 demonstrated, and in the process a range of legal and extralegal variables
 was identified that must be included in any properly specified model of
 pretrial release decisions. For example, Beeley (1927) found that risk of
 nonappearance was unrelated to conditions of pretrial release but that
 access to freedom was largely a function of defendants' financial resources.
 Foote (1954) and Alexander et aL (1958) similarly found cash bail to be
 the most frequent condition of release. Although both of these studies found
 a relationship between charge and bail outcome, Foote's analysis again
 indicated that the defendant's economic status was related to pretrial
 detention.
 The above findings suggested economic discrimination and led to an
 interest among policy makers in determining which defendant attributes, if
 any, were empirically linked to subsequent non-appearance, or "flight risk"
 (see Ares et al., 1966; Freed and Wald, 1964). The results of these efforts
 10 U.S. v. Salerno 794 F. 2d. 64 (2d. cir), cert granted, 107 S. Ct. (1986).
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 to develop measures of flight risk based on defendant attributes, such as
 ties to the community, were inconclusive (see Gottfredson, 1981; Feeley
 and McNaughton, 1974; Clarke et al, 1976; Landes, 1973, 1974;
 Christenson, 1971). Nonetheless, consideration of "community ties"
 achieved a legal status in the determination pretrial release decisions through
 the 1966 Bail Reform Act and subsequent reform legislation. This is reflected
 in our treatment of community ties in the analysis below.
 Another group of studies implicitly or explicitly employs the criteria
 of the 1966 Bail Reform Act to distinguish between legal and extralegal
 determinants of pretrial release decisions. The earlier of these studies are
 primarily descriptive and rely on frequencies and percentage differences.
 Nonetheless, Bynum (1977) reports that net of offense charged and prior
 record, defendant's income is associated with nonfinancial release (i.e.,
 release on recognizance, or ROR). Fleming's study of Detroit and Baltimore
 found relationships between contextual factors, such as the social, political,
 and organizational characteristics of local government, and the use of cash
 bail. A comparison across 20 jurisdictions from 1962 to 1971 by Thomas
 (1976) reveals a decrease in the use of preventive detention and an increase
 in the use of ROR.
 Turning to studies utilizing multivariate techniques, Goldkamp (1979)
 found that controlling for income-, job-, and asset-related variables, offense
 seriousness and defendant's prior record had a significant impact on release
 decisions. However, community ties did not have a significant effect. Nagel
 (1983) also found charge severity to have a significant effect on release
 decisions, while extralegal variables, including race and social class, had
 only minor effects. More specifically, Nagel reported that race had no
 significant effect on the ROR decision and only a small effect on the bail
 amount and the decision to offer a cash alternative. Nagel (1983, p. 506)
 concluded that "in this jurisdiction, for this sample during the period
 studied, age, race, sex and education predict poorly pretrial release
 decisions." The finding of negligible extralegal effects and the cautious
 contextualization of these results are worthy of special note.
 Finally, Farnworth and Horan (1980) use a covariance model to test
 the interaction of race with social background and procedural factors on
 the amount of bond. Relying on a large (N = 12,454) sample of court cases
 processed in the North Carolina Court system from January 1967 through
 April 1969, they found that, regardless of race, defendants in the lower
 occupational levels receive higher bond amounts. However, their analysis
 also reveals race-specific effects. They found (1980, p. 392) that "older white
 defendants and whites who are charged with more serious offenses are liable
 to greater bond charges." Furthermore, the data indicate that white defen
 dants who retain private counsel receive a lower amount of bond than black
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 defendants. The race interaction effects reported by Farnworth and Horan
 (1980) are important, but they must be interpreted with caution. We have
 noted extensive and lengthy judicial and legislative debates regarding the
 functions of bail. These debates underline the likelihood that Farnworth
 and Horan's models of bail decision making are misspecified in two impor
 tant ways: by failing to include information on the defendant's dangerous
 ness to the community upon release and information on the defendant's
 likelihood of jumping bail. Failing to include these variables overlooks three
 decades of debate over the variables legally relevant to the bail decision
 and fails to address the question of whether the effect of legally relevant
 variables varies with defendant's race. We return to this study below since
 their research interests overlap with our own.
 The research literature briefly reviewed covers a period of over 30 years,
 focusing primarily on policy issues (cf. Goldkamp, 1981, 1985, 1987) that
 followed from the legislative and judicial actions described above. Of
 perhaps greatest interest is the fact that community ties scales were
 developed in an attempt to provide an objective method of estimating flight
 risk and, thereby, to reduce inappropriate judicial reliance on extralegal
 criteria in determining pretrial release. These efforts failed to produce
 reliable and valid predictive scales (Goldkamp, 1983,1985), but the concept
 of community ties has nonetheless become a legally sanctioned part of the
 decision-making process. Meanwhile, the research literature indicates that
 there is a wide latitude of discretion in making pretrial release decisions,
 with the consequence that there is detainment of defendants in no particular
 relation to the flight risk they pose. However, the exact role of race and
 other stratification resources, along with a range of other legal and extralegal
 variables identified above, including dangerousness, remains unclear.
 4. PRETRIAL RELEASE DECISIONS IN TEN FEDERAL
 DISTRICT COURTS
 This research extends the analysis of pretrial release decisions by
 examining the interplay of race, stratification resources, and a number of
 other legal and extralegal variables. In this sense our research is consistent
 with the "legal realist" tradition of sociolegal research (see Nagel, 1983;
 Stryker et al., 1983), a tradition which seeks to draw a distinction between
 the "law in action" and the "law in the books." Methodologically, this
 tradition is expressed in research that examines the main effects of legal
 (the law in the books) and extralegal (the law in action) variables on judicial
 decisions.
 Our research also goes beyond traditional legal realist scholarship by
 considering a more subtle role that extralegal variables may play in allocating
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 judicial decisions. Our guiding hypothesis, derived from a structural prin
 ciple thought to operate across stratification systems, is that race of defen
 dant does not enter judicial decisions simply as a main effect but, rather,
 in interaction with stratification resources and other legal and extralegal
 variables. An implication of this guiding hypothesis is that the effects of
 stratification resources and other variables are at least partially contingent
 on the race of defendants. Put another way, it may be that the full effects
 of extralegal variables such as race and other stratification resources do not
 appear until one specifies interactions between legal and extralegal variables
 (Miethe and Moore, 1986). Of course, identification of such interaction
 effects not only would be important for policy purposes, but also, as we
 have emphasized, would illustrate a homology across stratification systems
 that has not previously been observed.
 Since Farnworth and Horan (1980) also have explored race and status
 interactions in bail decision making, it is important that we note theoretical
 and methodological differences in our approaches, which we believe serve
 to strengthen the validity of our findings. First, our covariance models
 include more complete measures of social background: the defendant's
 educational level and income. More importantly, our estimates are obtained
 controlling for two variables, dangerousness and flight risk, that we have
 seen are of theoretical interest to the ongoing debate over the legal function
 of bail. We include three measures of community ties in addition to a
 measure of whether the defendant has a record of jumping bail. The
 importance of these variables is noted in their main effects (see Table II),
 indicating their importance as control variables in testing for race interaction
 effects with social background factors. Finally, we should note, of course,
 that our research includes 10 federal court settings, while Farnworth and
 Horan considered only a single state. We move now to a description of our
 data and the specification of a structural equation model of pretrial release
 decisions.
 5. THE DATA
 The data11 consist of all 5660 male felony defendants processed from
 1974 through 1977 in 10 federal district courts which include the following
 cities: Eastern and Southern New York (Brooklyn and Manhattan), North
 ern Illinois (Chicago), Eastern Pennsylvania (Philadelphia), Maryland
 (Baltimore), Northern Texas (Dallas), Western Missouri (Kansas City),
 Northern Georgia (Atlanta), Central California (Los Angeles), and Eastern
 Michigan (Detroit). The data were collected with special provisions for
 "Data were provided by the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts with the assistance of Guy
 Willetts, Chief of Probation of the U.S. Courts, and by the National Institute of Mental Health.
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 quality control and comprehensiveness made possible through a mandate
 of Title II of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 to evaluate pretrial service
 agencies established under this Act. The provisions of the evaluation
 included that a population of cases was to be collected during this period.
 Interviews conducted by two of the authors of this paper with administrators
 of the pretrial service agencies established in each of these cities, as well
 as with other court personnel, indicated that full cooperation was achieved
 in the data collection effort.
 6. STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODEL OF PRETRIAL
 RELEASE DECISIONS
 The structural equation model of pretrial release decisions that we
 consider in this paper is specified and estimated within the LISREL
 framework of Jôreskog and Sôrbom (Jôreskog, 1973; Jôreskog and Sôrbom,
 1981a, b). This general model allows the simultaneous specification of a
 model linking constructs to indicators and a structural equation model
 stating the causal relationships among these variables. Two constructs
 introduced above, stratification resources and community ties, are of par
 ticular importance to our analysis. Stratification resources is an extralegal
 variable that forms an essential link to the larger stratification literature.
 Community ties is a legal variable that is of steadily increasing policy
 relevance. We have represented these as outcomes of multiple components
 within the LISREL model. Our model does not contain any latent or
 unobservable variables; within a single population it merely provides a way
 to organize and present a recursive model in observed variables. The LISREL
 specification does provide additional statistical power in our cross-racial
 comparisons of the pretrial detention decision.
 Below we model determinants of pretrial release as a structure involving
 the defendants' educational level (£,), income (£2), length of residence (£¡),
 marital status (£,), employment status (|3), history of bail jumping (&),
 dangerousness to the community (f7), type of crime (f8), prior felony
 convictions (£>), race (f10), stratification resources (77,), community ties
 (t72), and statutory seriousness of the crime (tj3). More specifically, the
 restrictiveness of the pretrial release decision, or in other words bail severity
 (774), is modeled as an allocation decision involving a set of exogenous
 variables, two composite constructs, and one additional endogenous vari
 able. Figure 1 depicts our model of pretrial release decisions, based on the
 following set of equations:
 Vi = + 7i,2& (1)
 T?2 = 72,3 6 + 72.4Í4+ 72,5 £s (2)
 V3 ~ 73,7^7 + 73,8+ 73,9^9 +¿3 (3 )
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 Fig. 1. Path model of the determinants of bail decision making.
 Vi - Pi.íVl + pA.lVl + 74,6^6 + 74,7^7 + Tuifs + 74,9& + 74,10^10+ PajVí + U
 (4)
 where
 f, = 1 if defendant completed high school or its equivalent,
 = 0 if defendant did not complete high school;
 £2 = defendant's yearly income;
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 & = defendant's months of residence in the community;
 £4 = 1 if defendant is married or in common-law relationship,
 = 0 if defendant is single, divorced or widowed;
 £5 = 1 if defendant is employed,
 = 0 if defendant is unemployed;
 = 1 if defendant has previously jumped bail,
 = 0 if defendant has not jumped bail;
 £7=1 if defendant ever used a weapon in a crime—dangerous,
 = 0 if defendant has not used a weapon—not dangerous;
 & = 1 is defendant is charged with white-collar crime,
 = 0 if defendant is charged with conventional crime;
 £9 = 1 if defendant has a record of adult felony convictions,
 = 0 if defendant has no prior adult felonies;
 £10 = 1 if defendant is black,
 = 0 is defendant is white;
 tj3 = maximum sentence defendant is exposed to by statute; and
 t}4 = 1 if defendant receives personal recognizance,
 = 2 unsecured bond,
 = 3 unsecured bond plus supervision,
 = 4 bail contingent on a 10% cash deposit,
 = 5 bail contingent on a 10% cash deposit plus supervision,
 = 6 bail with collateral or collateral plus supervision,
 = 7 bail contingent on a surety bond, or
 = 8 bail contingent on a surety bond plus supervision,
 = 9 if defendant is denied bail.
 Note that the final endogenous variable, bail severity (r/4), is an ordinal
 variable coded from least to most restrictive in terms of the conditions
 established for pretrial release or its denial. This approximates an interval
 scale of the severity of this decision.
 Some additional detail is necessary about the variables included in our
 analysis. We have already indicated that stratification resources is a com
 posite that is operationalized as a linear function of education and income.
 Although the Bail Reform Act of 1966 allowed consideration of financial
 resources in setting bail conditions, it did so for the purpose of establishing
 community ties. Community ties is operationalized as a separate construct
 that is measured as a linear function of length of residence, marital status,
 and employment. So any effect of stratification resources that is found net
 of the effect of community ties and other legal variables included in our
 model can be considered extralegal. Specifying our model with these con
 structs, we expect that both the composite stratification resources (77,) and
 community ties (172) cause bail severity (rj4), with the former mediating the
 extralegal effects of education (£,) and income (£,), and the latter mediating
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 the legal efiects of length of residence (|3), marital status (f4), and employ
 ment status (£5).
 In the analysis that follows, y,_, and y2,3 are fixed equal to 1.00 for
 purposes of normalization (see Bielby et al., 1977). When the coefficients
 leading to stratification resources and community ties, respectively, are
 determined in models with composite variables such as ours, the two
 composite variables are known exactly. Furthermore, the variables cause
 the composite variables as indicated, rather than being caused by the latent
 construct, as in factor analysis.
 The remaining five exogenous variables in the model allow us to
 examine the net effect of information thought to affect the bail decision.
 These variables are dichotomies indicating whether the defendant has ever
 jumped bail (f6), is dangerous in the sense of having used a weapon (f,),
 has previous adult felony convictions (f9), has committed a white-collar
 crime (£8), and is black (£I0). Only the white-collar crime variable requires
 further comment. We include this variable because of the uncertainty in
 the literature (see Hagan et al., 1980; Wheeler et al, 1982; Hagan and
 Parker, 1985) as to whether these offenses result in lenient treatment and
 because this variable provides another kind of stratification measure for
 our analysis. We developed this measure by first listing offenses against the
 United States Code that might plausibly fall within the category of white
 collar crime. We then asked United States Attorneys and their Assistants
 in the 10 districts whether they would designate these offenses as such. On
 this basis 31 offenses were consensually identified as white-collar, and the
 remainder were designated as conventional crimes.12
 ,2A short description of these ofienses follows: 15 U.S.C. Section 1 (1976) (antitrust violations);
 18 U.S.C. Sections 152, 201, 209, 287, 643, 648, 657, 658, 664, 1001, 1005, 1006, 1010, 1012,
 1014,1341,1343 (bankruptcy—concealment of assets, false oaths and claims, bribery; bribery,
 graft, and conflicts of interest—bribery of public officials and witnesses; bribery, graft, and
 conflicts of interest—salary of government officials and employees payable only by U.S.;
 bribery, graft, and conflicts of interest—offer to procure public office; claims and services
 in matters affecting the government—false or fraudulent claims; embezzlement and theft—
 accounting for public money; embezzlement and theft—custodians, generally misusing funds;
 embezzlement and theft—lending, credit, and insurance institutions; embezzlement and
 theft—property mortgaged or pledged to farm credit agencies; embezzlement and theft—theft
 or embezzlement from employee benefit plan; fraud and false statements—statements or
 entries generally; fraud and false statements—statements or entries generally; fraud and
 false statements—bank entries, reports, or false transactions; fraud and false statements—
 federal crime institutions entries, reports, and transactions; fraud and false statements—HUD
 and FHA transactions; fraud and false statements—loan and credit applications generally,
 also renewals and discounts, crop insurance; mail fraud—frauds and swindles, mail fraud—
 fictitious name or address; mail fraud—fraud by wire, radio, or television respectively); 26
 U.S.C. Sections 7201, 7203, 7206 (1976) (attempt to evade or defeat tax, failing to file tax
 return, fraud and false statements, respectively); 29 U.S.C. Section 501 (1976) (fraudulent
 acceptance of payments—veterans' benefits).
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 In addition to the two eta variables, stratification resources and com
 munity ties, the model includes two additional endogenous variables, statu
 tory seriousness of the offense (i?3) and bail severity (ij4). Statutory serious
 ness is measured by the maximum prison sentence provided in the United
 States Code for the charge initially placed against the offender. This is
 obviously a legal variable, while any effect of being charged with a white
 collar offense net of statutory seriousness and the other legal variables
 included in our model is clearly extralegal. As indicated earlier, the final
 endogenous variable in the model is an approximate interval ordering from
 least to most severe in the restrictiveness of the pretrial release decision or,
 in other words, a measure of bail severity.
 The path coefficient (04>3) estimating the effect of statutory seriousness
 on bail severity is specified because it frequently is assumed that the severity
 of the potential sanction is an element involved in the defendant's consider
 ation of flight and should, therefore, be a factor considered in the determina
 tion of pretrial release conditions. The model specifies main effects of
 stratification resources and community ties on bail severity. The remaining
 five exogenous variables, type of charge, record of bail jumping, prior felony
 convictions, race, and dangerousness, are allowed to affect bail severity
 directly. Only dangerousness, type of charge, and prior record are allowed
 also to affect bail severity indirectly through the endogenous variable statu
 tory seriousness of the offense.
 We allow type of offense to affect statutory severity (173) from an interest
 in determining if being charged with a white-collar offense affects bail
 severity through statutory seriousness, as a result of the less severe sanctions
 specified by law for this type of crime. As indicated above, inclusion of this
 indirect influence of type charge on bail severity assures that the further
 estimation of the direct effect (£4>8) of being charged with a white-collar
 offense on bail severity is not contaminated by the differential statutory
 seriousness of these crimes. The direct effect of type of offense on bail
 severity is, in this sense, extralegal.
 The dangerousness of the defendant, as indicated by use of a weapon
 in this or earlier crimes, is specified also in the model as a main effect on
 bail severity (-y4-7). Recall that the Bail Reform Act of 1966 was explicit in
 indicating that dangerousness of the defendant is an extralegal criterion in
 determining pretrial release.13 As noted earlier, our second concern is
 "Since the Bail Reform Act of 1966, a number of case decisions have served to clarify further
 the purpose of bail, each consistent with the act. The following are only a sampling of such
 cases: U.S. v. Parr, U.S. v. Cramer, U.S. v. Smith, U.S. v. Branson, Bell v. Wolfish, and U.S.
 v. Edwards, Schall v. Martin. In addition, it should be noted that the additional complexity
 in the flight risk and danger to the community debate provided by the Bail Reform Act of
 1984 does not apply to the analysis here since the data are of defendants processed from
 1974 to 1977.
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 whether there is evidence indicating that prior to the Bail Reform Act of
 1984 magistrates routinely included information on the defendant's
 dangerousness in deciding the outcome severity of the bail decision at a
 time during which such information was legislatively prohibited. Com
 parison of the coefficients for dangerousness and community ties provides
 a measure of the relative importance placed on these two types of informa
 tion in light of the contradictory mandates of the two Bail Reform Acts.
 7. RESULTS
 We turn now to a discussion of the results of our data analysis. This
 discussion is organized around an examination of the direction and magni
 tude of each estimated coefficient and an examination of a series of chi
 square tests of invariance of selected parameter estimates across racial
 groups. The latter, of course, reflects our interest in the variable influence
 of stratification resources and other legal and extralegal variables across
 these groups. First, however, we consider the full sample of white and black
 defendants.
 Table I is the correlation matrix used in estimating the LISREL model
 for the 5660 white and black male felony defendants processed through the
 Table I. Correlation Matrix for the Total Sample of Felony Male Defendants in Ten Federal
 District Courts"
 £1  ft  ft  ft  ft  ft  ft  ft  ft  fto  1?3  14
 ft  1.00
 (2  0.24  1.00
 ft  0.01  0.12  1.00
 u  0.03  0.24  0.05  1.00
 (s  0.17  0.77  0.08  0.17  1.00
 ft  -0.10  -0.11  -0.09  -0.03  -0.10  1.00
 £7  -0.03  -0.06  -0.02  -0.02  -0.05  -0.05  1.00
 £s  0.24  0.21  0.10  0.08  0.14  -0.07  -0.06  1.00
 &  -0.11  -0.13  -0.07  -0.05  -0.11  0.17  0.11  -0.10  1.00
 fio  -0.16  -0.26  -0.01  -0.06  -0.14  0.08  0.02  -0.12  0.03  1.00
 %  -0.06  -0.08  -0.04  -0.08  -0.05  0.22  0.08  0.22  0.03  0.04  1.00
 Vi  -0.10  -0.11  -0.15  -0.07  -0.10  -0.16  0.17  -0.16  0.18  0.03  0.14  1.00
 Difference
 in means'"  -0.16  -0.23  -0.01  -0.06  -0.14  0.08  0.02  -0.12  0.03  —  0.03  0.03
 SD  -0.89  21.57  0.99  0.49  0.48  0.38  0.17  0.33  2.02  —  6.75  0.29
 "Variables: f, (educational level), éi (income level), (length of residence), ¿4 (marital status), f5
 (employment status), ft (jumped bail), f7 (dangerousness), (s (white-collar crime), (prior record), f,0
 (race), t¡j (statutory seriousness), and i)4 (severity of bail outcome).
 ''The mean of each variable in the analysis was lost and cannot be generated. By way of providing some
 information on the variable means we regressed dependent's race on each variable, providing a difference
 of means across the two groups. This information is recorded for convenience.
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 Table n. LISREL Estimates, z Values, and Standardized Coefficients for Parameters in Model
 1 Estimated on Pooled Data"
 Endogenous variable
 Vi V2 % Vi
 (stratification (community (statutory (bail
 resources) ties) severity) severity)
 Exogenous variable
 (education) 1.00
 (income) 0.97
 0.08
 0.11
 (0.32)
 (length of residence)  1.00
 0.84
 £, (marital status)  0.58
 0.24
 (3.17)*
 (employment status)  0.92
 0.38
 (3.33)**
 (jumped bail)  0.58
 0.06
 (4.68)**
 (dangerousness)  2.46  2.12
 0.06  0.13
 (4.87)**  (10.25)**
 (type of ofiense)  -4.33  0.60
 -0.21  -0.07
 (16.29)**  (5.16)**
 f9 (prior record)  -0.01  1.62
 -0.001  0.11
 (0.03)  (8.98)**
 fio (race)  0.06  -0.08
 0.005  -0.02
 (0.36)  (1.14)
 Endogenous variable
 -ql (stratification resources)  -0.19
 -0.06
 (4.61)**
 7/2 (community ties)  -0.42
 -0.18
 (11.74)**
 7j3 (statutory severity)  0.04
 0.09
 (7.46)**
 Overall model x2 - 32.06
 df = 6
 P = 0.000
 "Order of reported findings: L1SREL estimates, standardized coefficients, z values.
 *P<0.01.
 **P<0.001.
This content downloaded from 156.56.168.2 on Thu, 10 Mar 2016 19:58:15 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 72  Albonetti, Hauser, Hagan, and Nagel
 10 federal district courts. Table II presents the estimated path coefficients
 and their associated levels of statistical significance. We consider the legal
 effects first. The latent variable community ties has the legally expected
 effect of reducing bail severity (j84>2 = -0.42, P< 0.001). This is as allowed
 by the Bail Reform Act of 1966. Also, the path indicates that defendants
 with records of jumping bail are likely to receive more severe bail conditions
 (74.6 = 0-58, P< 0.001), as are also defendants with prior felony records
 (y4]9 = 1.62, PcO.OOl).
 We turn now to extralegal influences on pretrial release decisions. The
 latent variable stratification resources exerts a considerable and statistically
 significant direct effect (/34>) = -0.19, P < 0.001) on bail severity. As expec
 ted, but contrary to the presumed purposes of the bail reform efforts, bail
 severity increases with declining stratification resources. Race, on the other
 hand, does not significantly influence (y410=-0.08, P> 0.05) pretrial
 release. We return to this finding below. Again contrary to the expressed
 intent of the Bail Reform Act, our measure of dangerousness increases bail
 severity (y4j7 = 2.12, P<0.001). These data indicate that dangerousness
 clearly influenced bail severity before the Bail Reform Act of 1984 and U.S.
 v. Salerno (1986) legitimized consideration of this factor.
 Finally, being charged with a white-collar crime both directly (y4>8 =
 -0.60, P< 0.001) and indirectly benefits the defendant in terms of reduced
 bail severity. The indirect effect is through the lower statutory seriousness
 of white-collar offenses (y3>8 = -4.33, P< 0.001). At least the former effect
 can be considered extralegal, as it occurs independent of the statutory effect.
 So far we have seen that extralegal as well as legal variables significantly
 affect the allocation of pretrial release decisions. These findings constitute
 an advance in the sense of estimating the effects of stratification resources
 and community ties as composite constructs in models of pretrial release
 decisions, and they identify a broader range of extralegal effects on pretrial
 release decisions than previously has been established. However, these
 findings do not contradict earlier studies in any explicit way. It is of particular
 interest that earlier studies have also found negligible main effects of race
 in bail decision making. However, we move now to the examination of the
 effects of stratification resources and other legal and extralegal variables
 across racial groups as a means of testing the structural principle that is
 central to this paper, namely, that stratification resources and other variables
 interact with defendant's race in their effect on bail severity. To pursue this
 analysis, the population of felony defendants is split into whites and blacks
 and Model 1 is examined within each group, with the model modified only
 to the extent of excluding race as an exogenous variable.
 Tables III and IV present the correlation matrices for the 2785 black
 and 2875 white male felony defendants, respectively. Table V indicates the
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 Table III. Correlation Matrix for Black Male Felony Defendants in Ten Federal District
 Courts"
 £l f2 ft ^4 fs ft ft ft ft V3 V4
 ft 100
 f2 0.18 1.00
 £, 0.02 0.09 1.00
 f4 0.03 0.20 -0.05 1.00
 f5 0.14 0.79 0.06 0.16 1.00
 & -0.06 -0.13 -0.09 -0.03 -0.12 1.00
 g7 -0.03 -0.07 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.04 1.00
 £8 0.18 0.17 0.06 0.02 0.13 -0.02 -0.05 1.00
 f9 -0.06 -0.10 0.07 -0.04 -0.08 0.14 0.08 -0.06 1.00
 173 -0.03 -0.08 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 -0.03 0.11 -0.18 0.02 1.00
 tj. -0.12 -0.11 -0.14 -0.04 -0.11 0.08 0.18 -0.11 0.10 0.14 1.00
 "Variables: f, (educational level), f2 (income level), f3 (length of residence), £, (marital
 status), (employment status), (jumped bail), f, (dangerousness), (white-collar crime),
 £9 (prior record), ij3 (statutory seriousness), and ij4 (severity of bail outcome).
 likelihood-ratio chi-square test statistics with their associated degrees of
 freedom for each cross-group test of invariance and the probability level
 for each test. It should be noted that with cross-group comparisons it
 becomes necessary statistically to place equality constraints on indices of
 constructs. Williams and Thomson (1983) point out that values of structural
 coefficients are dependent on how one chooses to normalize the constructs.
 Table IV. Correlation Matrix for White Male Felony Defendants in Ten Federal District
 Courts"
 f, & h S* is f6 6 & & % *74
 f, 1.00
 & -0.23 1.00
 f3 -0.05 0.08 1.00
 f4 0.02 0.27 0.13 1.00
 & 0.14 0.76 0.09 0.18 1.00
 f6 -0.11 -0.12 -0.12 -0.03 -0.09 1.00
 f, -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.08 1.00
 & 0.26 0.26 0.13 0.15 0.16 -0.09 -0.06 1.00
 (9 -0.16 -0.17 -0.11 -0.05 -0.15 0.23 0.15 -0.14 1.00
 t)3 -0.08 -0.09 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.25 0.04 1.00
 i?4 -0.11 -0.17 -0.21 -0.13 -0.15 -0.16 0.14 -0.19 0.26 0.14 1.00
 "Variables: (educational level), (income level), £, (length of residence), f4 (marital
 status), (employment status), £6 (jumped bail), (7 (dangerousness), £s (white-collar crime),
 (prior record), 773 (statutory seriousness), and i?4 (severity of bail outcome).
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 Table V. Chi-Square, Degrees of Freedom, and Probability Level for Models of Invariance
 Across Race Groups for Male Defendants
 Model"  *2  df  P
 1  Pooled model constraining the
 indices of SR and CT to be equal  53.65  15  0.00
 2  Invariance of /?41 cross groups  59.12  16  0.00
 3  In variance of /?4 2 cross groups  55.10  16  0.00
 4  Invariance of yib cross groups  56.23  16  0.00
 5  Invariance of yA7 cross groups  57.42  16  0.00
 6  Invariance of y4_g cross groups  56.59  16  0.00
 7  Invariance of y49 cross groups  70.50  16  0.00
 8  Invariance of y31 cross groups  61.53  16  0.00
 9  Invariance of y3 S cross groups  54.18  16  0.00
 10  Invariance of y3 9 cross groups  53.68  16  0.00
 11  Invariance of f}4 3 cross groups  81.25  16  0.00
 12  Pooled model with no equality constraints
 on indices of SR and CT  43.78  12  0.00
 "Models 1 through Model 11 estimated with equality constraints on the indices of CT and
 SR. (See footnote 8 for discussion.)
 Without corrections, our tests of the invariance of structural parameter
 estimates would be invalid. To avoid this, we follow the strategy of placing
 equality constraints across groups on our indices of stratification resources
 and community ties, respectively.14
 The first test of invariance we consider involves the latent variable that
 is most central to this analysis, stratification resources. In Table V we see
 14With our interest in group comparisons of structural parameter estimates, it becomes necessary
 to test the assumption of no differences in the indicators of stratification resources and
 community ties (Bielby et al., 1977; Gottfredson, 1981; Williams and Thomson, 1983). Using
 LISREL, we examine whether a model placing equality constraints on the two indicators of
 stratification resources and the three indicators of community ties provides a better fit to the
 data than a model that allows these indices to take their respective group values. The null
 hypothesis tested is Model 1 = Model 12, where Model 1 is the model of equality constraints
 across groups for the parameter estimates above and Model 12 is the model of no equality
 constraints for the above parameter estimates. Table VI provides the results of this test.
 Model 1 produces a goodness-of-fit statistic of 53.65 with 15 degrees of freedom (P = 0.000).
 Model 12 produces a goodness-of-fit statistic of 43.78 with 12 degrees of freedom (P = 0.000).
 Using the test of the difference between two nested models yields a x2 of 9.87 with 3 degrees
 of freedom (0.05 > P> 0.02). Given the importance of this test for later analysis, we require
 the chi-square difference test to be statistically significant at P s 0.01. With this probability
 level as our criterion we are unable to reject the hypothesis of no differences between the
 models. We employ Model 1 as the model for our cross-group comparisons. This permits
 us to test for cross-group differences in the effect of each construct with 1 degree of freedom,
 rather than with 2 degrees of freedom for stratification resources and 3 degrees of freedom
 for community ties.
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 that Model 2, which specifies the effect of stratification resources (/?4ii) as
 invariant across groups, produces a x2 = 59.12 with 16 degrees of freedom
 (P = 0.000). Comparing this chi-square value with that obtained for Model
 1, which specifies no equality constraints for stratification resources across
 groups, produces a chi-square test value in Table VI for the difference
 between M2 and Ml of 5.46 with 1 degree of freedom. This result allows
 a rejection of the null hypothesis that Ml = M2 at the 0.02 level. The effect
 of stratification resources on bail severity does vary across racial groups.
 The parameter estimates presented in Table VII reveal that this difference
 in effects is in the direction of stratification resources producing a greater
 reduction in the severity of bail conditions for whites (/341 = -0.33) than
 blacks (/34j1 = -0.12). That is, although both groups benefit from access to
 stratification resources, whites benefit more than blacks. This finding sup
 ports the assertion that the stratification of defendants in the criminal justice
 system is similar to that in other institutions of allocation.
 We next consider how additional legal and extralegal variables operate
 across the racial groupings, beginning with the other construct included in
 our model, community ties. Table V indicates that Model 3, which specifies
 the effect of community ties to be invariant across groups, produces a
 X2 = 55.10 with 16 degrees of freedom (P = 0.000). The chi-square difference
 indicated in Table VI between Model 1 and Model 3 is 1.44 with 1 degree
 of freedom, which does not allow a rejection of the null hypothesis that
 Model 3 = Model 1. The legal variable community ties apparently operates
 similarly for whites and blacks.
 Performing the same chi-square difference test for Model 1 and Model
 5 indicates that the effect of the defendant's dangerousness does not vary
 across groups. Comparisons of Model 4 and Model 6 with Model 1 similarly
 Table VI. Chi-Square Difference Tests of Invariance of Specific Estimates Cross
 Black Male and White Male Defendants
 Model tested  X2 difference df  P  Conclusion
 Ml = M2  5.46 1  0.02  Reject H0
 Ho  Ml = M3  1.44 1  0.20  Fail to reject
 H0  Ml = M4  2.57 1  0.10 <P< 0.20  Fail to reject
 H0  Ml = M5  3.76 1  0.05 <P< 0.10  Fail to reject
 H0  Ml = M6  2.93 1  0.05<jP<0.10  Fail to reject
 Ho  Ml = M7  16.85 1  <0.001  Reject H0
 Ho  Ml = M8  7.87 1  0.001 < P<0.01  Reject Ho
 H0  Ml = M9  0.52 1  >0.70  Fail to reject
 H0  Ml = M10  0.02 1  >0.80  Fail to reject
 H0  Ml = Mil  27.59 1  <0.0001  Reject H0
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 Table VII. LISREL Estimates, Standardized Coefficients, and z Values for Parameters in
 Model 1 Estimated Separately for Black and White Defendants"
 Black defendants  White defendants
 Vi  V2  Vs  V4  V2  Vi  V*
 Exogenous variables
 1.00
 0.96
 1.21
 0.15
 (0.54)
 it
 e.2
 1.00
 0.96
 1.21
 0.15
 (0.54)
 |3
 &
 <T6
 f7
 (»
 6
 Engodenous variables
 Vt
 1)2
 Error
 disturbances 0
 1.00
 0.93
 0.35
 0.16
 (2.97)*
 0.57
 0.16
 (3.17)*
 1.00
 0.93
 0.35
 0.16
 (2.97)*
 0.57
 0.26
 (3.17)*
 0.86  0.45
 0.09  0.05
 (4.40)***  (2.84)**
 1.06  1.59  3.98  2.41
 0.03  0.10  0.10  0.14
 (1.38)  (5-27)***  (5.61)***  (8.35)***
 -4.50  -0.74  -4.10  -0.34
 -0.22  -0.08  -0.20  -0.04
 (13.46)***  (5.27)***  (9.17)***  (179)
 -0.09  2.58  -0.003  1.10
 -0.003  0.18  -0.001  0.08
 (0.13)  (9.51)***  (0.004)  (4.67)***
 -0.12  -0.33
 0.04  -0.10
 (2.25)*  (4.89)***
 -0.58  -0.66
 -0.22  -0.25
 (12.66)***  (12.38)***
 0.04  0.05
 0.10  0.11
 (5.43)***  (5.92)***
 43.09  6.77  43.49  7.06
 "Order of reported findings: LISREL estimates, standardized coefficients, z values.
 *P<0.05.
 **P<0.01.
 ***P< 0.001.
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 indicate that the effects of the defendant's record of bail jumping and type
 of charge are invariant across groups. Dangerousness, jumping bail, and
 being charged with a conventional crime all have negative effects that are
 commensurate for white and black defendants in terms of increasing bail
 severity.
 We turn now to the effects of having a record of prior adult felony
 convictions. Model 7 constrains the effect of such a record to be invariant
 across groups and produces a *2 = 70.50 with 16 degrees of freedom (P =
 0.000). Referring to Table VII we see that the obtained x2 of 16.85 for the
 difference in Models 1 and 7 with 1 degree of freedom allows rejection of
 the null hypothesis that M7 = M1 at the P< 0.001 level of significance.
 Rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that a prior record of adult felony
 conviction operates differently for whites and blacks. Table VII indicates
 the source that prior felony conviction produces a greater severity of bail
 outcome for black (y4>9 = 2.58) than white defendants (y4>9=1.10). Both
 groups pay for these convictions, but blacks pay more.
 Finally, we consider the tests for the cross-group comparisons of
 coefficients affecting statutory seriousness of the offense (173) and the effects
 of statutory seriousness on bail severity. The first two tests, involving the
 null hypotheses that Ml = M9 and Ml = M10, yield nonsignificant results.
 This indicates that the effects of type of charge and prior record of felony
 convictions on statutory seriousness of the offense do not vary across racial
 groups. However, the statistically significant chi-square difference statistic
 for the comparison of Model 8 with Model 1 indicates that the effect of
 dangerousness on statutory severity (y3>7) does vary across race groups.
 Referring to Table VII, we see that dangerousness produces an effect of
 y3>7=1.06 (P<0.001) for black defendants, but for white defendants the
 effect is much stronger, y3j7 = 3.98 (P< 0.001). Clearly, dangerousness of
 the defendant results in a higher statutory severity for white defendants
 than for black defendants, contrary to expectations derived from labeling
 or conflict theory.
 Referring to Table VII, the effect of statutory seriousness on bail severity
 also varies across groups. Table VI indicates that Model 11, which specifies
 an invariance in the effects of statutory seriousness across groups, is sig
 nificantly different from Model 1, which allows this effect to vary. The null
 hypothesis of no difference is rejected. Finally, in Table VII we see that the
 difference observed is in the form of the statutory seriousness of the offense
 charged having a greater influence on the bail severity for white than for
 black defendants. This finding is consistent with Farnworth and Horan's
 (1980) research challenging further the conflict and labeling theory's one
 dimensional characterization of disadvantage in the American criminal
 justice system.
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 8. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
 In this paper we have addressed two concerns. First, we have sought
 to examine criminal justice decision making at the federal court level as an
 allocation process based on structural principles that are similar to those
 of other stratification systems. The present study of pretrial release decisions
 provides considerable evidence of such an allocation process. To begin,
 pretrial release decisions in the federal courts are influenced by both legal
 and extralegal variables. That is, both are a part of the stratification process.
 On the one hand, variables measuring weak community ties, bail jumping,
 and prior felony convictions have the effects legally expected under the
 Bail Reform Act, increasing the severity of pretrial release decisions. These
 findings hold for estimates obtained on the joint population of defendants
 (see Table II) and for estimates obtained on race specific populations (see
 Table VII). On the other hand, variables measuring stratification resources,
 dangerousness, and being charged with a white-collar crime have effects,
 unintended by the Bail Reform Act, in effect at the time the cases were
 processed.
 A primary concern in this paper has been to open a new avenue of
 research on criminal justice decision making by exploring a more subtle
 structural principle that influences the allocation of pretrial release decisions
 as well as other stratification processes. This principle is that stratification
 resources, measured as a multidimensional construct with education and
 income as its observed components, operate to the greater advantage of
 whites than blacks. While this and previous studies have found that the
 main effect of race on pretrial release decisions is negligible, with the
 exception of Farnworth and Horan's (1980) research, interactions of race
 with stratification resources have not been explored. As noted earlier,
 Farnworth and Horan's study of race-specific effects on bail decision making
 failed to estimate the effect of the defendant's dangerousness to the com
 munity and the defendant's record of jumping bail—two variables central
 to the decades-old debate over defining the legally relevant information to
 the pretrial release decision. Our findings point to the direct and indirect
 influence these variables exert on judicial discretion.
 This research further indicates that the above structural principle and
 the interactions it implies do indeed operate in the allocation of pretrial
 release decisions. That is, stratification resources and prior record of felony
 convictions act to the disadvantage of black defendants. Most significantly,
 we find that, although stratification resources reduce the severity of bail
 decisions for both racial groups, this influence is greater for white than for
 black defendants. In other words, whites receive the greater advantages that
 stratification resources provide. These findings support the white public's
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 perceptions of inequality in the criminal justice system (Yankerovich, Skelly,
 and White, Inc., 1977). We say more about black respondents' perceptions
 below.
 However, our findings suggest, contrary to conflict theory and labeling
 theory, that black defendants are not always placed in a disadvantageous
 position relative to whites. Our research indicates that increases in the
 statutory severity of the offense produce more severe outcomes for white
 defendants than their black counterparts. Moreover, the greater effect of
 dangerousness on statutory severity for white defendants further contributes
 to the disadvantage produced by the effect of statutory severity on bail
 outcome. These findings point to the importance of including information
 on the defendant's dangerousness in any analysis of race-specific effects on
 the pretrial release decision.
 Our second concern has been to research further the relationship
 between law and legal practices. Analyzing federal magistrate decision
 making occurring prior to the Bail Reform Act of 1984, we found that
 information on the defendant's dangerousness was routinely used to increase
 the severity of bail decisions. Inclusion of this information was in conflict
 with the Bail Reform Act of 1966 then in effect. Based on these findings
 we suggest that; consistent with Bohannon's (1965) assertion concerning a
 role of law, the Bail Reform Act of 1984 served to reinstitutionalize magis
 trate norms regarding the operational definition of justice at the bail stage
 of case processing. These findings are generalizable to federal case process
 ing. Whether these findings apply to state court decision making remains
 to be investigated.
 Returning to our initial interest, the finding that stratification resources
 work to the greater advantage of whites than blacks helps to make sense
 of prior research on public perceptions of the criminal justice system. Hagan
 and Albonetti (1982) report from an analysis of a national sample of
 Americans that blacks, and especially blacks who have achieved a position
 in the professional managerial class, perceive that the criminal justice system
 works to their relative disadvantage. Yet criminal justice research repeatedly
 casts doubt on such perceptions, finding negligible main effects of race on
 outcomes (e.g., Kleck, 1981). Our findings suggest an explanation of this
 paradox. It may be that the influence of race is more complicated than
 previously recognized, operating in interaction with stratification resources
 and other legal and extralegal variables. Our findings in particular point to
 a clear reason why blacks in the professional managerial class perceive so
 much criminal injustice: in our data, stratification resources simply do not
 bring the same return in the allocation of pretrial release decisions for
 blacks as for whites. The lesson seems to be this: as in other stratification
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 systems, white defendants in the criminal justice system receive better returns
 on their resources.
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